CfP: Portfolio Allocation and Ministerial Selection in the Life Cycle of Governments (SISP Conference)

MV
Michelangelo Vercesi
Wed, Apr 28, 2021 10:12 AM

Call for Papers – ‘Portfolio Allocation and Ministerial
Selection in the Life Cycle of Governments’

Sorry for cross-posting

Dear Colleagues,

we are delighted to announce a call for papers for a panel
on ‘Portfolio Allocation and Ministerial Selection in the
Life Cycle of Governments’
(https://www.sisp.it/english-guide-for-participants-2),
which will take place at the next Annual Conference of the
Italian Political Science Association (SISP). The
Conference will be held as Virtual Event, on September
9th-11th, 2021. You may find the panel abstract at the
bottom of this message.

The panel will be chaired by Andrea Pedrazzani (University
of Milan) and Michelangelo Vercesi (Leuphana University of
Lüneburg).

The panel is part of a broader ‘Comparative Politics’
section, organized by Gianfranco Baldini and Elisabetta De
Giorgi. You may find detailed information in English about
the submission process at this link:
https://www.sisp.it/in-evidenza/call-for-papers-2.

The deadline for paper submissions is Monday MAY, 17th.

Please, note that registration fees are particularly
convenient for junior scholars. Here, you can find an
overview of the different registration options:
https://www.sisp.it/en/registration-and-fees. SISP members
do not have to pay any fee.

For any further information or query, please do not
hesitate to get in touch with the panel chairs
(michelangelo.vercesi@leuphana.de;
andrea.pedrazzani@unimi.it).
Looking forward to receiving your proposal.

Best wishes,
Andrea Pedrazzani & Michelangelo Vercesi

Panel abstract

In parliamentary systems, the political executive can be
dismissed by the parliamentary majority, by means of a
no-confidence motion. When a cabinet ends, parties in
parliament bargain to form a new government and to renew
its personnel. In this regard, the life of governments has
been conceived of as a cycle, made up of four
interconnected phases: government formation; cabinet
governance; termination; and (if any) elections. Each
phase is both a ‘condition’ of the following and a
‘consequence’ of the previous. While lot has been said
about the four phases, relatively less attention has been
paid to the distribution of ministerial responsibilities
among ministers and parties, as a process intertwined with
them. Some evidence suggests that portfolio allocation can
be a crucial mechanism of mutual party control in
coalitions, potentially consequential for policy outputs
and government stability. We also know that the ‘right’
selection of ministers reduce the peril of ‘agency loss’
within governments. Moreover, cabinet reshuffles can be
pursued as a strategy to cope with delegation problems
within the government, in an attempt to prolong the
duration of cabinets. This panel aims to advance the study
of executive politics, through the systematic integration
of portfolio allocation in the debate about governments’
life cycle in parliamentary systems. As suggested by Bäck
and Carroll (2020), portfolio allocation can be analyzed
from a party quantitative (who gets how much); a party
qualitative (who gets what); or an individual viewpoint
(who becomes minister). Indicative research questions are:
do previous party collaborations affect portfolio
allocation?; how does coalition formation’s complexity
affect portfolio allocation?; how does portfolio
allocation determine government governance and
termination?; which is the relationship between changes in
cabinet posts and cabinet stability?; is the
ministeriables’ background linked to the distribution of
ministerial responsibilities within and between parties?;
when do parties select non-partisan ministers? The panel
encourages papers addressing portfolio allocation as a
dependent and/or independent variable. The focus can be
either on coalition governments or party factions in
single-party cabinets. Papers can be theoretical or
empirical, and comparative works as well as theory-guided
single-case studies are welcome. This panel is endorsed by
the SISP Standing Group on Governo, Parlamento e
Rappresentanza (Government, Parliament, and
Representation).

--
Priv.-Doz. Dr. Michelangelo Vercesi

Lecturer in Political Science
Center for the Study of Democracy
Leuphana University Lüneburg

Call for Papers – ‘Portfolio Allocation and Ministerial Selection in the Life Cycle of Governments’ *Sorry for cross-posting* Dear Colleagues, we are delighted to announce a call for papers for a panel on ‘Portfolio Allocation and Ministerial Selection in the Life Cycle of Governments’ (https://www.sisp.it/english-guide-for-participants-2), which will take place at the next Annual Conference of the Italian Political Science Association (SISP). The Conference will be held as Virtual Event, on September 9th-11th, 2021. You may find the panel abstract at the bottom of this message. The panel will be chaired by Andrea Pedrazzani (University of Milan) and Michelangelo Vercesi (Leuphana University of Lüneburg). The panel is part of a broader ‘Comparative Politics’ section, organized by Gianfranco Baldini and Elisabetta De Giorgi. You may find detailed information in English about the submission process at this link: https://www.sisp.it/in-evidenza/call-for-papers-2. The deadline for paper submissions is Monday MAY, 17th. Please, note that registration fees are particularly convenient for junior scholars. Here, you can find an overview of the different registration options: https://www.sisp.it/en/registration-and-fees. SISP members do not have to pay any fee. For any further information or query, please do not hesitate to get in touch with the panel chairs (michelangelo.vercesi@leuphana.de; andrea.pedrazzani@unimi.it). Looking forward to receiving your proposal. Best wishes, Andrea Pedrazzani & Michelangelo Vercesi Panel abstract In parliamentary systems, the political executive can be dismissed by the parliamentary majority, by means of a no-confidence motion. When a cabinet ends, parties in parliament bargain to form a new government and to renew its personnel. In this regard, the life of governments has been conceived of as a cycle, made up of four interconnected phases: government formation; cabinet governance; termination; and (if any) elections. Each phase is both a ‘condition’ of the following and a ‘consequence’ of the previous. While lot has been said about the four phases, relatively less attention has been paid to the distribution of ministerial responsibilities among ministers and parties, as a process intertwined with them. Some evidence suggests that portfolio allocation can be a crucial mechanism of mutual party control in coalitions, potentially consequential for policy outputs and government stability. We also know that the ‘right’ selection of ministers reduce the peril of ‘agency loss’ within governments. Moreover, cabinet reshuffles can be pursued as a strategy to cope with delegation problems within the government, in an attempt to prolong the duration of cabinets. This panel aims to advance the study of executive politics, through the systematic integration of portfolio allocation in the debate about governments’ life cycle in parliamentary systems. As suggested by Bäck and Carroll (2020), portfolio allocation can be analyzed from a party quantitative (who gets how much); a party qualitative (who gets what); or an individual viewpoint (who becomes minister). Indicative research questions are: do previous party collaborations affect portfolio allocation?; how does coalition formation’s complexity affect portfolio allocation?; how does portfolio allocation determine government governance and termination?; which is the relationship between changes in cabinet posts and cabinet stability?; is the ministeriables’ background linked to the distribution of ministerial responsibilities within and between parties?; when do parties select non-partisan ministers? The panel encourages papers addressing portfolio allocation as a dependent and/or independent variable. The focus can be either on coalition governments or party factions in single-party cabinets. Papers can be theoretical or empirical, and comparative works as well as theory-guided single-case studies are welcome. This panel is endorsed by the SISP Standing Group on Governo, Parlamento e Rappresentanza (Government, Parliament, and Representation). -- Priv.-Doz. Dr. Michelangelo Vercesi Lecturer in Political Science Center for the Study of Democracy Leuphana University Lüneburg