Workshop on Responding to the demand? Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies

MD
Matthias Dilling
Tue, Feb 13, 2024 8:56 AM

Dear colleagues

I would be grateful if you could please circulate the call for papers below for a workshop on “Responding to the demand? Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies”, co-organized by Léonie de Jonge and myself and held at Swansea University on 15 and 16 July. Submission deadline for abstracts is 15 March. Thank you!

Responding to the demand?
Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies

We welcome submissions of abstracts for an upcoming 2-day workshop that aims to assemble papers exploring the potential strategies of non-populist parties, including mainstream parties but also new “challenger” parties that cannot be classified as populist, in addressing public grievances that underpin the ascent of the populist radical right (PRR). The rise of PRR parties in European democracies has caused widespread concern over the future of liberal democracy. To explain this rise, demand-side explanations have highlighted both contextual conditions as well as individual-level attitudes that make voters more prone to support PRR parties (e.g. Golder, 2016; Harteveld et al., 2022; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). In contrast, supply-side studies have highlighted the mechanisms that enable PRR parties to capitalize on this lingering demand (e.g. Art, 2011; Hansen and Olsen, 2024). However, PRR parties do not have a monopoly on this lingering demand for alternatives; indeed, non-populist parties can also potentially tap into this pool of voters (de Jonge, 2021). Yet, whether and how non-populist parties can respond to these grievances and thereby absorb demand for PRR parties remains contested.

We invite abstract submissions that explore this and related questions. Submissions could investigate but are not restricted to the following themes.

  1. Addressing policy concerns: Evidence suggests that accommodating PRR positions fuels rather than weakens PRR support (Krause et al., 2022), contributes to further legitimizing and mainstreaming the PRR (Abou-Chadi et al., 2022), and risks alienating more moderate supporters (Chou et al., 2021). At the same time, adopting an adversarial response can also lead to PRR gains and entail coordination problems among mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005; Heinze, 2018) and harden the dissatisfaction with democracy among voters opposed to multiculturalism (Rekker and van Spanje, 2021). What can mainstream parties then do? Can they address these concerns without either mainstreaming the PRR or harden PRR supporters’ dissatisfaction with democracy? How can they signal that they take voters’ grievances seriously without alienating moderate supporters at a time of growing societal polarization? Do positional responses need to focus on immigration or multiculturalism, or are there important policy grievances among PRR supporters that have been less prominently discussed in the literature?

  2. Politicizing new issues: At the same time, we have seen the rise of new political parties that have attracted substantive support from former PRR supporters without adopting a populist platform by politicizing new or previously neglected issues. While this strategy has often been associated with PRR success, “issue entrepreneurs” have not been solely confined to the PRR (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020; Riker, 1982). Centrist anti-establishment parties, for instance, have often built a catch-all base, attracting support from the left, center, and right, by combining anti-corruption claims with anti-establishment positions and a non-radical ideological profile (Engler, 2023). Initially a phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe, recent elections indicate the rise of similar parties also in Western Europe. The newly founded New Social Contract party in the Netherlands is a case in point. What characterizes these parties compared to the previously studied parties in Central and Eastern Europe? How and why have they succeeded in appealing to PRR voters? And how do they mediate between their different constituencies within their organizations?

  3. Innovating off- and online interaction: Local political and social activism have helped PRR and far-right parties to connect with voters, promote and normalize their positions, and recruit new activists (e.g. Ellinas, 2020: chap. 5; Van Kessel and Albertazzi, 2021). How can non-PRR parties respond to this development? To what extent can the organizational innovations, recently introduced by many parties (Alexandre-Collier et al., 2020), help fill this void? To what extent can enhanced forms of online participation serve as an important complement or substitute for traditional forms of interest incorporation (e.g. Dilling, 2024)?
    The workshop aims to serve as the basis for a subsequent special issue project with interested participants. It will be held on 15 and 16 July 2024 at Swansea University (South Wales, United Kingdom). There is no conference fee, and travel and accommodation bursaries are available to one presenter per accepted paper. Catering will be provided.

Please send your abstracts no later than 15 March 2024 to matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.ukmailto:matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.uk. We look forward to your proposals, and please do not hesitate to contact us should you have any questions.

Matthias Dilling (Swansea University) and Léonie de Jonge (University of Groningen) – Co-organizers

Dear colleagues I would be grateful if you could please circulate the call for papers below for a workshop on “Responding to the demand? Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies”, co-organized by Léonie de Jonge and myself and held at Swansea University on 15 and 16 July. Submission deadline for abstracts is 15 March. Thank you! Responding to the demand? Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies We welcome submissions of abstracts for an upcoming 2-day workshop that aims to assemble papers exploring the potential strategies of non-populist parties, including mainstream parties but also new “challenger” parties that cannot be classified as populist, in addressing public grievances that underpin the ascent of the populist radical right (PRR). The rise of PRR parties in European democracies has caused widespread concern over the future of liberal democracy. To explain this rise, demand-side explanations have highlighted both contextual conditions as well as individual-level attitudes that make voters more prone to support PRR parties (e.g. Golder, 2016; Harteveld et al., 2022; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). In contrast, supply-side studies have highlighted the mechanisms that enable PRR parties to capitalize on this lingering demand (e.g. Art, 2011; Hansen and Olsen, 2024). However, PRR parties do not have a monopoly on this lingering demand for alternatives; indeed, non-populist parties can also potentially tap into this pool of voters (de Jonge, 2021). Yet, whether and how non-populist parties can respond to these grievances and thereby absorb demand for PRR parties remains contested. We invite abstract submissions that explore this and related questions. Submissions could investigate but are not restricted to the following themes. 1. Addressing policy concerns: Evidence suggests that accommodating PRR positions fuels rather than weakens PRR support (Krause et al., 2022), contributes to further legitimizing and mainstreaming the PRR (Abou-Chadi et al., 2022), and risks alienating more moderate supporters (Chou et al., 2021). At the same time, adopting an adversarial response can also lead to PRR gains and entail coordination problems among mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005; Heinze, 2018) and harden the dissatisfaction with democracy among voters opposed to multiculturalism (Rekker and van Spanje, 2021). What can mainstream parties then do? Can they address these concerns without either mainstreaming the PRR or harden PRR supporters’ dissatisfaction with democracy? How can they signal that they take voters’ grievances seriously without alienating moderate supporters at a time of growing societal polarization? Do positional responses need to focus on immigration or multiculturalism, or are there important policy grievances among PRR supporters that have been less prominently discussed in the literature? 1. Politicizing new issues: At the same time, we have seen the rise of new political parties that have attracted substantive support from former PRR supporters without adopting a populist platform by politicizing new or previously neglected issues. While this strategy has often been associated with PRR success, “issue entrepreneurs” have not been solely confined to the PRR (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020; Riker, 1982). Centrist anti-establishment parties, for instance, have often built a catch-all base, attracting support from the left, center, and right, by combining anti-corruption claims with anti-establishment positions and a non-radical ideological profile (Engler, 2023). Initially a phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe, recent elections indicate the rise of similar parties also in Western Europe. The newly founded New Social Contract party in the Netherlands is a case in point. What characterizes these parties compared to the previously studied parties in Central and Eastern Europe? How and why have they succeeded in appealing to PRR voters? And how do they mediate between their different constituencies within their organizations? 1. Innovating off- and online interaction: Local political and social activism have helped PRR and far-right parties to connect with voters, promote and normalize their positions, and recruit new activists (e.g. Ellinas, 2020: chap. 5; Van Kessel and Albertazzi, 2021). How can non-PRR parties respond to this development? To what extent can the organizational innovations, recently introduced by many parties (Alexandre-Collier et al., 2020), help fill this void? To what extent can enhanced forms of online participation serve as an important complement or substitute for traditional forms of interest incorporation (e.g. Dilling, 2024)? The workshop aims to serve as the basis for a subsequent special issue project with interested participants. It will be held on 15 and 16 July 2024 at Swansea University (South Wales, United Kingdom). There is no conference fee, and travel and accommodation bursaries are available to one presenter per accepted paper. Catering will be provided. Please send your abstracts no later than 15 March 2024 to matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.uk<mailto:matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.uk>. We look forward to your proposals, and please do not hesitate to contact us should you have any questions. Matthias Dilling (Swansea University) and Léonie de Jonge (University of Groningen) – Co-organizers
MD
Matthias Dilling
Mon, Mar 11, 2024 8:04 PM

Dear colleagues

I would be grateful if you could please circulate this reminder for the call for papers (closing on Friday) below for a workshop on “Responding to the demand? Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies”, co-organized by Léonie de Jonge and myself and held at Swansea University on 15 and 16 July. Submission deadline for abstracts is 15 March. Thank you!

Responding to the demand?
Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies

We welcome submissions of abstracts for an upcoming 2-day workshop that aims to assemble papers exploring the potential strategies of non-populist parties, including mainstream parties but also new “challenger” parties that cannot be classified as populist, in addressing public grievances that underpin the ascent of the populist radical right (PRR). The rise of PRR parties in European democracies has caused widespread concern over the future of liberal democracy. To explain this rise, demand-side explanations have highlighted both contextual conditions as well as individual-level attitudes that make voters more prone to support PRR parties (e.g. Golder, 2016; Harteveld et al., 2022; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). In contrast, supply-side studies have highlighted the mechanisms that enable PRR parties to capitalize on this lingering demand (e.g. Art, 2011; Hansen and Olsen, 2024). However, PRR parties do not have a monopoly on this lingering demand for alternatives; indeed, non-populist parties can also potentially tap into this pool of voters (de Jonge, 2021). Yet, whether and how non-populist parties can respond to these grievances and thereby absorb demand for PRR parties remains contested.

We invite abstract submissions that explore this and related questions. Submissions could investigate but are not restricted to the following themes.

  1. Addressing policy concerns: Evidence suggests that accommodating PRR positions fuels rather than weakens PRR support (Krause et al., 2022), contributes to further legitimizing and mainstreaming the PRR (Abou-Chadi et al., 2022), and risks alienating more moderate supporters (Chou et al., 2021). At the same time, adopting an adversarial response can also lead to PRR gains and entail coordination problems among mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005; Heinze, 2018) and harden the dissatisfaction with democracy among voters opposed to multiculturalism (Rekker and van Spanje, 2021). What can mainstream parties then do? Can they address these concerns without either mainstreaming the PRR or harden PRR supporters’ dissatisfaction with democracy? How can they signal that they take voters’ grievances seriously without alienating moderate supporters at a time of growing societal polarization? Do positional responses need to focus on immigration or multiculturalism, or are there important policy grievances among PRR supporters that have been less prominently discussed in the literature?

  2. Politicizing new issues: At the same time, we have seen the rise of new political parties that have attracted substantive support from former PRR supporters without adopting a populist platform by politicizing new or previously neglected issues. While this strategy has often been associated with PRR success, “issue entrepreneurs” have not been solely confined to the PRR (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020; Riker, 1982). Centrist anti-establishment parties, for instance, have often built a catch-all base, attracting support from the left, center, and right, by combining anti-corruption claims with anti-establishment positions and a non-radical ideological profile (Engler, 2023). Initially a phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe, recent elections indicate the rise of similar parties also in Western Europe. The newly founded New Social Contract party in the Netherlands is a case in point. What characterizes these parties compared to the previously studied parties in Central and Eastern Europe? How and why have they succeeded in appealing to PRR voters? And how do they mediate between their different constituencies within their organizations?

  3. Innovating off- and online interaction: Local political and social activism have helped PRR and far-right parties to connect with voters, promote and normalize their positions, and recruit new activists (e.g. Ellinas, 2020: chap. 5; Van Kessel and Albertazzi, 2021). How can non-PRR parties respond to this development? To what extent can the organizational innovations, recently introduced by many parties (Alexandre-Collier et al., 2020), help fill this void? To what extent can enhanced forms of online participation serve as an important complement or substitute for traditional forms of interest incorporation (e.g. Dilling, 2024)?
    The workshop aims to serve as the basis for a subsequent special issue project with interested participants. It will be held on 15 and 16 July 2024 at Swansea University (South Wales, United Kingdom). There is no conference fee, and travel and accommodation bursaries are available to one presenter per accepted paper. Catering will be provided.

Please send your abstracts no later than 15 March 2024 to matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.ukmailto:matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.uk. We look forward to your proposals, and please do not hesitate to contact us should you have any questions.

Matthias Dilling (Swansea University) and Léonie de Jonge (University of Groningen)
– Co-organizers

Dear colleagues I would be grateful if you could please circulate this reminder for the call for papers (closing on Friday) below for a workshop on “Responding to the demand? Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies”, co-organized by Léonie de Jonge and myself and held at Swansea University on 15 and 16 July. Submission deadline for abstracts is 15 March. Thank you! Responding to the demand? Voters’ grievances, PRR success, and mainstream party strategies We welcome submissions of abstracts for an upcoming 2-day workshop that aims to assemble papers exploring the potential strategies of non-populist parties, including mainstream parties but also new “challenger” parties that cannot be classified as populist, in addressing public grievances that underpin the ascent of the populist radical right (PRR). The rise of PRR parties in European democracies has caused widespread concern over the future of liberal democracy. To explain this rise, demand-side explanations have highlighted both contextual conditions as well as individual-level attitudes that make voters more prone to support PRR parties (e.g. Golder, 2016; Harteveld et al., 2022; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). In contrast, supply-side studies have highlighted the mechanisms that enable PRR parties to capitalize on this lingering demand (e.g. Art, 2011; Hansen and Olsen, 2024). However, PRR parties do not have a monopoly on this lingering demand for alternatives; indeed, non-populist parties can also potentially tap into this pool of voters (de Jonge, 2021). Yet, whether and how non-populist parties can respond to these grievances and thereby absorb demand for PRR parties remains contested. We invite abstract submissions that explore this and related questions. Submissions could investigate but are not restricted to the following themes. 1. Addressing policy concerns: Evidence suggests that accommodating PRR positions fuels rather than weakens PRR support (Krause et al., 2022), contributes to further legitimizing and mainstreaming the PRR (Abou-Chadi et al., 2022), and risks alienating more moderate supporters (Chou et al., 2021). At the same time, adopting an adversarial response can also lead to PRR gains and entail coordination problems among mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005; Heinze, 2018) and harden the dissatisfaction with democracy among voters opposed to multiculturalism (Rekker and van Spanje, 2021). What can mainstream parties then do? Can they address these concerns without either mainstreaming the PRR or harden PRR supporters’ dissatisfaction with democracy? How can they signal that they take voters’ grievances seriously without alienating moderate supporters at a time of growing societal polarization? Do positional responses need to focus on immigration or multiculturalism, or are there important policy grievances among PRR supporters that have been less prominently discussed in the literature? 1. Politicizing new issues: At the same time, we have seen the rise of new political parties that have attracted substantive support from former PRR supporters without adopting a populist platform by politicizing new or previously neglected issues. While this strategy has often been associated with PRR success, “issue entrepreneurs” have not been solely confined to the PRR (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020; Riker, 1982). Centrist anti-establishment parties, for instance, have often built a catch-all base, attracting support from the left, center, and right, by combining anti-corruption claims with anti-establishment positions and a non-radical ideological profile (Engler, 2023). Initially a phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe, recent elections indicate the rise of similar parties also in Western Europe. The newly founded New Social Contract party in the Netherlands is a case in point. What characterizes these parties compared to the previously studied parties in Central and Eastern Europe? How and why have they succeeded in appealing to PRR voters? And how do they mediate between their different constituencies within their organizations? 1. Innovating off- and online interaction: Local political and social activism have helped PRR and far-right parties to connect with voters, promote and normalize their positions, and recruit new activists (e.g. Ellinas, 2020: chap. 5; Van Kessel and Albertazzi, 2021). How can non-PRR parties respond to this development? To what extent can the organizational innovations, recently introduced by many parties (Alexandre-Collier et al., 2020), help fill this void? To what extent can enhanced forms of online participation serve as an important complement or substitute for traditional forms of interest incorporation (e.g. Dilling, 2024)? The workshop aims to serve as the basis for a subsequent special issue project with interested participants. It will be held on 15 and 16 July 2024 at Swansea University (South Wales, United Kingdom). There is no conference fee, and travel and accommodation bursaries are available to one presenter per accepted paper. Catering will be provided. Please send your abstracts no later than 15 March 2024 to matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.uk<mailto:matthias.dilling@swansea.ac.uk>. We look forward to your proposals, and please do not hesitate to contact us should you have any questions. Matthias Dilling (Swansea University) and Léonie de Jonge (University of Groningen) – Co-organizers